The Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings by Cammett Melani; Diwan Ishac; & Ishac Diwan

Author:Cammett, Melani; Diwan, Ishac; & Ishac Diwan
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Routledge

Perceived Inequality

The Arab region is not distinguished by exceptionally high levels of inequality, nor has inequality risen sharply (Bibi and Nabli 2011). Thus, rising absolute levels of inequality, as measured by household expenditures surveys, do not provide satisfactory explanations for the Arab uprisings. Rather, we argue that perceptions of inequality, which are refracted through particular sociopolitical contexts and reflect developments that are hard to measure, are critical to an account of authoritarian breakdown and social protest in the Arab countries.

It is tempting to make inequality a core driver of an understanding of the Arab Spring in the context of the transition from state quasi-socialism and populism toward capitalism. The equilibrium of the last decade is commonly described as a regime of crony and unequal capitalism. This system appears to have generated socially unacceptable inequalities, directly by supporting the growth of a class of the super-rich and indirectly by its inability to create sufficient good jobs for the newly educated middle classes. Yet no direct evidence suggests that inequality has risen sharply in the recent past. Household surveys reveal that consumption inequality (as measured by Gini coefficients) has risen moderately in Egypt, from about 0.3 in the 1990s to 0.35 in the 2000s (Belhaj and Wissa 2011; Bibi and Nabli 2011). In Tunisia, inequality as measured by consumption inequality fell, from about 0.43 in the mid-1980s to 0.39 in the mid-2000s, but there are also indications of a rise in the urban-rural divide. Furthermore, levels of inequality vary across the Arab transitioning countries, with lower levels in Egypt and higher levels in Tunisia (Bibi and Nabli 2011, 31).

There are two reasons to think that these statistics describe only a limited part of reality. First, household surveys are notorious for undercounting the rich. There are many indications of a rise in the income share of the 10% richest in society, who are perceived to have benefited most from a more market-oriented economy, and of the top 1%, who have benefited most from the rampant crony capitalism of the last decade. By some estimates, the top 10% in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Syria may have commanded 30 to 40% of GDP by 2010.10

Second, grievances are also likely to be connected to changes in the inequality of opportunities rather than to only the inequality of incomes per se. Over time the rollback of the state had reduced the role of the state as an employer. In Egypt, for example, only 25% of the labor force worked for the state by 2009, declining from a height of 40% of the workers. In Jordan, the private sector has generated more jobs than in the past, but these jobs generally lack social insurance and/or are based on temporary or no contracts. Furthermore, the bifurcation between the formal and informal private sectors has sharpened. Informal-sector workers tend not to transition into formal-sector jobs, and although public-sector employment has increased in recent years, workers who previously held positions in the formal private sector are far more likely than informal-sector workers to move into government jobs (Assaad 2011).

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